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More importantly, perhaps, the work on categorisation discussed here has a re­
levance to literary theory and aesthetics which has not, to my knowledge, been 
so far considered. Rosch and likewise Putnam (whose work is discussed in Chap­
ter 6) argue that the use of prototypes or stereotypes in our categorial think­
ing is not an unfortunate aberration, but actually necessary and central to it. 
Hence, we could reasonably expect literary and other artistic works both to 
deploy stereotypes as exemplars of a category, but also expect that those lit­
erary works which set out to defamiliarise or estrange us from objects will 
deploy peripheral or doubtful members of a category to focus our attention on 
that category. So, for instance, in Thomas Keneally's S c h in d le r 's  A r k , Oskar 
Schindler is not a prototypical moral hero; and an Allen Jones table is doubt­
ful as between a table and a metaphor for the position of women. Again, the 
effect of a Borges taxonomy on Foucault (Foucault, 1970, p. xv) occurs, as he 
recognises, just because the alleged taxonomy cannot be made to fit the pattern 
with which we are familiar and which, Berlin and Rosch argue, is universal: 
animals c a n n o t, except in fiction, be categorised into '(a) belonging to the 
Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame ..., (n) that from a long way off look like 
flies'.
E.D.B, TREVOR PATEMAN
U n iv e rs ity  o f  Sussex.
My thanks to Fiona Sparks for a helpful conversation on this book.
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Experimental psychologists are often accused of using elaborate laboratory 
methodology to arrive at simple common sense conclusions. Nobody should accuse 
-James Deese of this, however, since his methods of studying language production 
are both simple and common sense. Most psychologists of language construct mod­
els of how we speak and understand, derive predictions from their models, and 
test the predictions in experiments. Deese listens to ordinary language, and 
simply describes what he hears.
"Thought into Speech" reports a lengthy project in which Deese (who teaches 
psycholinguistics at the University of Virginia) and his assistants recorded, 
transcribed and classified some 25 hours of spontaneous speech. This quite 
ordinary and unelaborate procedure led them to a number of common sense con­
clusions, for example: speech communicates not only literal messages but also 
covert ones; extra-linguistic devices such as pausing can serve linguistic 
functions and pragmatic functions simultaneously; syntactic devices such as 
choice of tense can be used to express speaker attitude. The book reports no 
laboratory experiments (although there are some simple confirmations of common 
sense predictions, for instance that long, syntactically complex sentences are 
harder to recall verbatim than shorter, simpler ones) and no instrumental 
measurements (although pause durations were measured in a small sample of ut­
terances). The analysis is descriptive, and the descriptions are subjective.
Nineteenth-century scientists had to settle for such research methods by 
default; so do researchers in underfunded laboratories still; but Deese embraces 
them by choice. He feels that the experimental tradition in psychology has told
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us "virtually nothing about how language is processed", and that current psycho­
linguistics is as sterile as its predecessor in the psychology of language, 
verbal learning theory. J)eese 's solution is a voluntary return to nineteenth 
century methodology, importing from the twentieth century only the tape recorder, 
so that he can listen to the same speech repeatedly.
Nineteenth century researchers, of course, did not produce detailed models 
of cognitive functioning; and nor does Deese. He has "little confidence in formal 
models except as kinds of rough guides"; he feels that psychology's goal of under­
standing mental processes is "hopelessly unattainable", and that the only pros­
pect of future insight lies with neuropsychology. That is, he has knowingly depart­
ed from current psychological practice not only in his choice of methodology, 
but in his philosophy of science - he opts for a reductionist position, in which 
very few cognitive psychologists of today would care to join him.
As if philosophical and methodological isolationism were not enough, Deese 
even seems to be trying to warn off potential readers - he explicitly suggests 
that his observations may have only very limited generalisability. "Thought into 
Speech" is subtitled "Psychology of a Language" because, its author repeatedly 
warns us, it describes not the use of language in general, but the use of one 
register (public debate) of one dialect (standard educated) of one regional 
variant (American) of one language (English). Deese hesitates to extend his 
conclusions to other registers of the same dialect, let alone to other languages.
But is speaking American English really so unlike speaking other languages?
For instance, is it really so unlikely that multiple functions of hesitation 
pauses might be characteristic of other languages? Luckily, relevant evidence 
is available. Deese is not the only researcher to have undertaken to describe 
a large corpus of spontaneous speech in recent years; a similar project is, for 
instance, the Survey o f  Spoken E ng lish  based at University College London under 
the directorship of Randolph Quirk. Quirk, in collaboration with Swedish col­
leagues, has made his transcribed material publicly available (Svartvik & Quirk,
1980), so that there are already many studies in print which have made use of 
it. These studies suggest that Deese's modesty is unnecessary - his speakers 
behaved just like the London speakers.
One exception lies in Deese's prosodic descriptions of his material. In many 
ways this too parallels previous accounts: for example, he found topic shifts 
("new paragraphs") to be typically accompanied by raised pitch and amplitude, 
as did the instrumental measurements of Edinburgh speech reported by Brown,
Currie and Kenworthy in 1980, and of Boston speech by Menn and Boyce in 1982. But 
the intonation contours which Deese heard at the ends of sentences seem to have 
been unusual. At the ends of sentences and phrases speakers' intonation tends 
to drop towards their baseline; this is known to prosody researchers as the 
declination effect. If speakers want to signal something special, e.g. a ques­
tion, they can do it by using rising pitch. Yet in marked contrast to the results 
of previous studies, Deese reports that 42% of his speakers' sentences ended 
with n e i th e r  falling nor rising pitch. Thus it would appear that speakers of 
educated American English engaging in public debate are prosodically quite like 
other speakers - except that they fail to show a declination effect.
This seems, alas, rather unlikely. Instrumental studies have never found a 
high proportion of level contours. It might therefore be necessary to take at 
least the prosodic descriptions which Deese reports with some caution. This 
caveat highlights the problem with all such large, descriptive studies. If the 
entire corpus is published for all to exploit, there is no doubt that the work 
is useful; the volume of research which the Survey o f  Spoken E ng lish  has inspired, 
for instance, is adequate testimony that linguistics considers Quirk's project 
to have made a valuable contribution. If the raw data remain unavailable, how­
ever, the reader can only gauge the reliability of the published summary descrip­
tions by comparing them with previous studies. Where they replicate previous re­
sults, little has been learned. Where they fail to replicate previous results, 
one must choose, on some principled basis, which result to believe. Many will
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base their choice on methodology, preferring to believe results from replicable, 
controlled, or instrumental studies over subjective descriptions. Thus it is 
almost inevitable that a book like Deese's will have little impact on its field.
This is a pity, for a great deal of hard work has gone into the project. 
Perhaps it is not too late to encourage Deese to keep up the good work a little 
longer and either publish the corpus material, or buttress his subjective de­
scriptions with more objective measurements. He might also be encouraged to 
flesh out many of his brief observations about the nature of speech production. 
For example, Deese's corpus apparently contains a large number of very wordy 
utterances, in which embedded clause follows embedded clause. Syntactic elabora­
tion of this kind is deplored by prose stylists. Deese rejects such a blanket 
prohibition - the rule-makers have not recognised, he claims, that wordiness 
can serve to indicate politeness. Deese himself seems not to have recognised what 
is most interesting about this observation, namely that polite wordiness is more 
common in spoken language, and that this is one way in which speech differs con­
siderably from writing. The present material could well have shed light on the 
ways in which effective uses of spoken versus written language differ. Like the 
book as a whole, this is something of a missed opportunity.
M edical Research Council A p p lied  Psychology U nit ANNE CUTLER
U n iv e r s ity  o f  Cambridge
Note
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Commentaries on structuralist and poststructuralist poetics can be divided into 
two categories: there are those which impose rigorous philosophical demands on 
the reader by attempting to present the theoretical issues on a level which ap­
proaches the difficulty of the original discourse, and there are those, like 
Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan's , which seek to transcribe post-Saussurean thought into 
more recognisable and accessible terms.
Student-orientated commentaries, especially shorter ones, inevitably tend 
towards the latter course. The problem with explaining new and difficult theo­
retical positions lies in the nature of explanation: to present something in 
intelligible, familiar terms is always, to a certain extent, to recuperate it 
into the idiom of orthodoxy. Radical new ideas can only exist as footnotes to 
our old ones, so commentary on them serves to soften their impact. Catherine 
Belsey confronts this problem in the introduction to her New A ccents  book 
C r i t i c a l  P r a c t ic e : 'The undertaking (making new theories accessible without 
transcribing them back into everyday discourse) is in a sense contradictory: to 
explain is inevitably to reduce the unfamiliarity and so to reduce the challenge 
of the post-Saussurean positions'.1
As a series, New A ccents  has focussed on this recent (largely structuralist
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